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Postmodern	Intimations:	Musing	on	Invisibility:	William
Faulkner,	Richard	Wright,	and	Ralph	Ellison
PHILIP	WEINSTEIN
In	the	white	world	the	man	of	color	encounters	difficulties	in	the	development	of	his	bodily	schema.
—FRANTZ	FANON
Three	modern	novelists	of	race	relations:	what	in	their	work	begins	to	appear—within	our
contemporary	optic—as	implicitly	postmodern?	How	does	their	representation	of	the
“invisible”	racial	subject	intersect	with	a	later	postmodernism’s	more	wholesale
deconstruction	of	the	subject?	That	is	my	question,	and—since	I	plan	to	be	critical	myself—it
may	be	best	to	begin	on	a	cautionary	note.	Critics	invested	in	postmodernism	can	be
remarkably	simpleminded	about	modernism.	Their	most	strident	remarks	often	have	a	déjà-vu
quality,	indicting	modernism	with	the	very	naivetes	that	modernism	used	(a	generation	earlier)
to	indict	realism:	the	centered	subject,	a	foundational	project,	claims	of	disinterestedness	and
universality.	Since	this	lazyminded	approach	to	modernism	drives	me	crazy,	I	need	to	be
careful	not	to	oversimplify	postmodernism	in	the	same	ways.1	For	postmodern	fiction	has
evolved	in	numerous	directions,	making	a	unified	field	theory	impossible.	How	could	the	same
characterizations	have	a	purchase	on	textual	worlds	as	different	as	Barthelme’s	parodic	games,
Italo	Calvino’s	self-generating	narratives,	Gabriel	García-Márquez’s	magic	realism,	and	Toni
Morrison’s	brooding	reframing	of	American	history?2
In	what	follows,	the	postmodernist	generalizations	I	shall	offer	refer	mainly	to	the	brilliant,
brittle	American	fictions	of	the	’60s	and	’70s—typically	white-male	authored,	self-reflexive,
terminally	playful.	Its	practitioners	include	Donald	Barthelme,	John	Hawkes,	Robert	Coover,
and	John	Barth;	its	philosophers	include	Roland	Barthes,	Jean-François	Lyotard,	Jean
Baudrillard,	and	Richard	Rorty;	its	commentators	include	Brian	McHale	and	Linda	Hutcheon.
(These	names,	I	know,	hardly	make	up	a	school,	but	they	do	suggest	some	familial	contours.)
Rather	than	trying	to	say	that	such-and-such	is	postmodernism	(a	fruitless	endeavor),	I	am
talking	about	some	of	its	salient	tendencies.	A	penchant	for	the	performance	of	roles	rather	than
genuine	identity,	an	insistence	on	parody,	a	conviction	that	texts	cannot	access	the	real	but
derive	from	and	rewrite	other	texts,	a	suspicion	about	master	narratives	and	a	consequent
leaning	toward	the	“local,”	a	Nietzchean	preference	for	play/construction	rather	than
truth/correspondence,	a	recurrence	to	pragmatic	terms	like	“conversation,”	“utility,”	and
“pleasure,”	a	pervasive	anxiety	that	the	global	spread	of	technological	capitalism	has	erased
the	very	meaning	of	“the	individual”	and	that	amnesiac/schizophrenic	flight	represents	one	of
the	few	options	still	remaining:	these	are	the	stances	I	have	in	mind	and	that	operate,	in
miniature,	in	Barthelme’s	minimalist	definition	of	the	“sentence”:	the	sentence	is	“a	manmade
object,	not	the	one	we	wanted	of	course,	but	still	a	construction	of	man,	a	structure	to	be
treasured	for	its	weakness,	as	opposed	to	the	strength	of	stones.”3	Barthelme’s	postmodern
“sentence”	rebukes	an	earlier	time’s	more	ambitious	sentence:	play-artifice	rather	than	truth-
correspondence,	language’s	weakness	rather	than	its	strength,	a	tone	of	wry	acceptance	of
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irreducible	linguistic	conditions	rather	than	a	raging	desire	to	overcome	them	and	somehow
speak	the	real	itself.	These	orientations	radiate	out	of	that	little	“sentence”	and	serve	as	context
for	the	following	argument	about	Faulkner,	Wright,	and	Ellison.
I	want	to	launch	this	musing	on	postmodern	Yoknapatawpha,	however,	by	citing	a	fourth
novelist	from	the	that	postmodernist	group	identified	above,	John	Barth.	Before	moving	into	the
arena	of	borderline	postmodern	practices—as	glimpsed	in	Faulkner,	Wright,	and	Ellison—let’s
start	with	the	real	thing	(slipping	past	postmodernism’s	horror	at	the	notion	of	any	“real
thing”).	Barth	opens	his	1958	novel	The	End	of	the	Road	with	these	arresting	words,	“In	a
sense,	I	am	Jacob	Horner.”4	In	a	sense	only.	Here	we	have	a	salient	version	of	the	postmodern
subject:	a	fictional	role	I	perform,	a	linguistic	phrase	that	stands	in	for	me	(who	I	would	be	if
my	name	really	identified	me).	This	sentence	hooked	me	when	I	read	it	years	ago,	and	even
more	the	funny/terrible	moment	when	putative	Jacob	Horner	talks	Rennie	Morgan	into
eavesdropping	on	her	dignified,	all-American-type	husband	Joe.	Rennie	demurs:	“Real	people
aren’t	any	different	when	they’re	alone….	What	you	see	of	them	is	authentic.”	To	this	Horner
replies:	“Horseshit.	Nobody’s	authentic.	Let’s	look”	(67).	What	they	see	is	Joe	Morgan	in	front
of	the	mirror	antically	practicing	the	military	moves	that	support	his	all-American	mask,	then
rushing	back	to	his	writing	desk,	“his	tongue	gripped	purposefully	between	his	lips	at	the	side
of	his	mouth	…	masturbating	and	picking	his	nose	at	the	same	time.	I	believe	he	also	hummed	a
sprightly	tune	in	rhythm	with	his	work”	(70–1).
Musing	on	invisibility:	for	postmodern	Barth	identity	is	pure	mask.	The	chasm	between	the
role-playing	self	visibly	performed	in	public	and	the	incoherent	self	invisibly	enacted	in
private	is	breathtaking,	scandalous.	This	chasm	between	visible	and	invisible	invalidates	the
very	concept	of	authenticity:	a	state	in	which	concealed	and	revealed	would	both	refer	to	an
essential	core.	As	the	sinister	“Doctor”	in	Barth’s	novel	explains	to	Jacob	Horner,	identity	has
nothing	to	do	with	essence	but	is	rather	a	matter	of	visibly	asserted	masks,	“Don’t	think	there’s
anything	behind	them:	ego	means	I,	and	I	means	ego,	and	the	ego	by	definition	is	a	mask….	If
you	sometimes	have	the	feeling	that	your	mask	is	insincere—impossible	word!—it’s	only
because	one	of	your	masks	is	incompatible	with	another”	(90).	Behind	the	mask,	beneath	the
role,	deeper	than	the	language	that	proclaims	it,	there	is—nothing:	a	nothing	that	passes	itself
off	as	a	something.	As	Baudrillard	writes,	“To	dissimulate	is	to	feign	not	to	have	what	one
has,”	whereas	“to	simulate	is	to	feign	to	have	what	one	hasn’t.”5	Dissimulation	is	a	staple	of
Western	narratives—what	the	Victorians	comfortably	called	hypocrisy,	a	fullness	of	motive
seeking	to	conceal	itself	but	always	outed	by	the	end	of	a	Victorian	novel:	Uriah	Heep	in	a
hundred	different	incarnations	populates	reassuringly	the	vast	stage	of	Victorian	fiction.
Simulation,	however,	is	postmodern.	Identity	in	Barth’s	The	End	of	the	Road	is	a	simulation,
not	a	mask	hypocritically	concealing	an	essence	but	a	mask	deceptively	standing	in	for	a	void.
It’s	an	exhilarating	idea.
For	Faulkner’s	Joe	Christmas,	however,	it	is	an	unbearable	idea,	generating	unassuageable
nausea.	Being	no	one—lacking	essential	identity,	empty	at	the	core—is	worse	by	far	than
having	to	be	black:	“‘I	aint	a	nigger’	[little	Joe	Christmas	says	to	the	black	man	working	at	the
orphan	yard]	and	the	nigger	says	‘You	are	worse	than	that.	You	don’t	know	what	you	are.	And
more	than	that,	you	wont	never	know.	You’ll	live	and	you’ll	die	and	you	won’t	never	know.’”6
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It	is	desperate	in	Faulkner	not	to	know	who	we	are—who	our	parents	are,	what	our	culture	is,
what	racial,	gender,	and	classed	narratives	have	been	internalized	and	shaped	our	identity.
These	arrangements	have	fundamentally	formed	and	deformed	us,	prior	to	consent	and	at	a
level	beneath	consciousness.	It	is	not	possible	in	Faulkner	to	lack	deep	identity,	although	it	is
recurrent	to	suffer—often	fatally—from	conflicting	forms	of	identity	that	have	been	willy-nilly
“installed”	within	us.	“Memory	believes	before	knowing	remembers”:	Joe	Christmas’s	entire
life	exhibits	a	stunning	unconscious	consistency.	The	crisis-moments	Faulkner	chooses	to
narrate	Joe’s	becoming	accumulate	to	produce	not	a	simulated	selfhood	masking	emptiness	but
an	overfilled	identity—intolerably	coherent,	however	decentered—that	must	in	the	course	of
time	erupt.	His	modernist	invisibility	has	little	in	common	with	that	of	John	Barth’s	postmodern
characters.	Seen	or	not	seen,	Christmas	is,	unfortunately,	culturally	marked	to	the	core,	doomed
to	be	who	he	is.
To	situate	Faulknerian	invisibility	further	and	then	move	from	it	to	the	different	kinds	of
invisibility	operative	in	Wright	and	Ellison,	I	want	first	to	backtrack	to	Dostoevsky.	Whatever
else	they	are	doing,	all	three	later	writers	are	engaged	in	revising	Dostoevsky,	for	Notes	from
Underground	gives	us	Western	literature’s	first	invisible	man.	A	low-grade	Russian	civil
servant,	Dostoevsky’s	underground	man	tortures	himself	by	walking	up	and	down	Nevsky
Prospect	in	St.	Petersburg:	invisible.	He	spends	years	seeking	revenge	for	the	insult	of	being,
precisely,	ignored.	(An	officer	had	ignored	him	by	removing	him	bodily	from	the	edge	of	a
billiards	table	without	noticing	him).	Ignored	by	others,	he	is	also	incoherent	to	himself:	“And
now	I	am	living	out	my	life	in	my	corner,	taunting	myself	with	the	spiteful	…	consolation	that	it
is	even	impossible	for	an	intelligent	man	seriously	to	become	anything	…	only	fools	become
something.”7	The	two	states	seem	inseparable	yet	incompatible:	on	the	one	hand,	to	be
coherent	for	oneself	(to	be	anything)	involves	being	coherent	for	some	others,	i.e.,
recognizable	to	them.	On	the	other	hand,	he	passionately	rejects	all	the	terms	for
recognizability	that	his	culture	offers	him:	“only	fools	become	something.”
It	is	not	so	much	that	he	is	invisible	as	that	he	does	not	count:	the	forms	of	visible	identity
available	to	him	are	in	the	eyes	of	others	socially	demeaning	and	in	his	own	eyes	ideologically
repellent.	What	he	looks	like	is	a	failed	petty	bureaucrat,	yet	one	who	fiercely	opposes	that
humiliating	take	upon	him.	Repudiate	as	he	might	St.	Petersburg’s	official	codes	for	self-
making,	he	is	alienated	from	any	more	traditional	resources	and	is	incapable	of	piecing
together	a	viable	identity	of	his	own.	He	thus	remains	cravenly	dependent	for	his	self-esteem
upon	the	very	ones	he	scorns	and	who	in	turn	scorn	him.8	“I’ll	show	them”	is	the	motto	of	the
resentful	misfit	who	cannot	rise	to	conceptual	rebellion	and	exit	from	the	game	altogether.	His
“refusal	to	accept	a	definition	of	himself	…	in	terms	imposed	by	the	alien	world	of	European
culture”	avails	him	nothing.9	Dostoevsky	pursues	this	plight	of	an	overly	intelligent	man	who
will	not	be	a	disempowered	functionary,	yet	who	remains	ensnarled	within	a	bureaucratized
social	system	that	has	dispossessed	him	of	all	native	resources	for	self-making.	In	this	text	he
goes	underground,	but	by	the	following	year	Dostoevsky	has	found	his	way	into	the	more
sinister	form	of	revenge	such	unharnessed	and	resentful	energy	must	eventually	take:	murder,
radical	repudiation	of	the	social	pact	that	disempowers	him.10	Invisibility	translates	here	as	a
humiliating	impotence	within	a	bureaucratized	culture’s	identity	norms,	and	Dostoevsky’s	next
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hero,	Raskolnikov,	even	more	pinched	and	beleaguered,	launches	with	his	murderous	act	the
novel	that	the	subsequent	ones	I’m	exploring	could	be	named:	Crime	and	Punishment.
Dostoevsky’s	philosophic	murder	enters	Faulkner’s	American	canvas	as	a	race	murder.	It	is
race—rather	than	any	set	of	maverick	ideas	beyond	traditional	good	and	evil—that	Light	in
August	knows	to	be	most	explosively	invisible.	Raskolnikov,	scorning	both	the	pieties	of	his
orthodox	upbringing	and	the	secular/bureaucratic	assumptions	of	St.	Petersburg,	raging	at	his
fate	as	an	insignificant	intellectual	misfit,	aspires	to	Nietzschean	revenge,	a	guiltfree	murder.11
Joe	Christmas,	by	contrast,	wouldn’t	recognize	an	iconoclastic	idea	if	it	hit	him	over	the	head:
what	he	will	not,	cannot,	make	sense	of—what	releases	his	acts	of	violence—is	an	incoherent
racial	inheritance.	Christmas	himself	is	achingly	visible	(his	parchment-colored	skin	is
abusively	witnessed	by	all),	but	his	racial	identity	is	invisible,	socially	disappeared,
biologically	unknowable.	Faulkner	creates	him	discontinuously,	through	a	series	of	violent
scenes:	beating	Joe	Brown	in	the	early	chapters,	then	the	toothbrush-vomiting	scene	when	the
dietitian	calls	him	a	“little	nigger	bastard,”	followed	by	his	adolescent	beating	of	the	black	girl
in	the	shed,	his	being	ritually	beaten	by	McEachern	over	the	catechism,	his	being	beaten	by
Max	and	the	stranger	at	the	end	of	his	romance	with	Bobbie,	and	finally	his	beating	Joanna
Burden	during	their	foredoomed	affair.	The	question	of	Joe’s	invisible	racial	identity	coils
within	most	of	these	scenes	of	assault;	he	can	access	his	racial	identity	only	as	a	violent
question.	(When	a	prostitute	fails	to	be	scandalized	by	his	announcement	that	he	“is”	black,	he
nearly	kills	her;	he	requires	repudiation	to	know	himself.)
Deep	identity	in	Light	in	August	is	perversely	secured	by	such	acts	of	passionate
aggression	calling	themselves	“training.”	In	Christmas,	Faulkner	shows	us	a	man	who	is
Calvinist	in	his	behavior	(“I	had	to	do	it,”	he	thinks	before	killing	Joanna,	“already	in	the	past
tense”	[280])	though	believing	in	nothing,	as	well	as	a	man	who	is	black	in	the	behavior
visited	upon	him	(“nigger	murderer”	the	town	delights	in	labeling	him),	though	he	himself	is
not	culturally	black	nor	is	any	biological	basis	for	his	racial	identity	knowable.	The	social
engine	producing	narratives	of	normative	identity	is	thus	stripped	of	legitimacy—its
knowledge	base	shown	to	be	a	patchwork	of	rumor	or	assumption—but	it	does	not	therefore
dismantle	itself,	it	just	becomes	more	lethally	effective.	The	training	imposed	by	social	code
now	passes	outside	the	realm	of	conscious	pedagogy	altogether,	moving	automatically	into	the
muscles	rather	than	engaging	the	brain,	issuing	in	murderous	behavior	that	requires	no
foundation	in	articulable	belief	or	demonstrable	fact.	Identity	in	Jefferson	is	lodged	deeper
than	thought,	producing	a	community	that—at	its	worst—assumes	everything	and	interrogates
nothing.	As	Byron	tells	Hightower,	“[Hines]	knew	somehow	that	the	fellow	[who	called
himself	Mexican]	had	nigger	blood.	Maybe	the	circus	folks	told	him.	I	don’t	know.	He	aint
never	said	how	he	found	out,	like	that	never	made	any	difference.	And	I	reckon	it	didn’t,	after
the	next	night”	(374).	That	is,	by	the	next	night,	the	fellow	(Milly’s	lover,	also	invisibly	black)
is	as	dead	as	Joe	will	be	by	the	end	of	the	novel.	In	the	oppressively	racist	world	of	Light	in
August,	no	underground	space	exists	in	which	the	subject	might	be	free	of	a	culture’s	lethally
polar	predications;	everyone	must	simply	be	white	or	black.12	Racial	invisibility	emerges	as
worse	than	useless,	enraging	white	folks	in	search	of	their	tag	and	bringing	down	violence
upon	the	putative	black	man,	producing	in	Joe	a	ceaseless	sadomasochism	that	he	would	gladly
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trade	in	for	peaceful	self-acceptance.
All	of	Faulkner’s	art	is	marshaled	to	give	us	the	pathos	of	this	undoing,	for	if	we	(like
everyone	else)	never	learn	who	he	racially	“is,”	we	do	learn—we	alone	learn—what	it	is	like
to	be	Joe	Christmas:	Faulkner	positions	us	overwhelmingly	inside	his	sentient	mind	and	nerves
during	the	first	half	of	the	novel.	Reversing	expected	sequences,	giving	us	effects	before	we
can	fathom	their	causes,	the	form	of	Light	in	August	patiently	reveals	the	constructedness—the
ungivenness—of	all	forms	of	racial,	gender,	and	religious	conviction,	even	as	it	shows	the
murderous	insistence	of	a	culture	that	cannot	afford	to	interrogate	its	convictions.13	Modernist
constructedness	is	thus	a	far	cry	from	postmodern	randomness.14	The	convictions	represented
in	Light	in	August	may	be	startlingly	arbitrary	in	the	sense	of	ungrounded,	but	they	are	anything
but	arbitrary	in	the	consequences	they	unleash.	Put	otherwise,	he	is	not	Joe	Christmas	in	a
sense,	but	Joe	Christmas	all	the	way.	Though	everyone	inside	the	novel	(including	Joe)	gets	his
identity	wrong,	though	there	is	no	way	in	Faulkner’s	1930s	South	for	anyone	to	get	his	identity
“right,”	Joe	Christmas	has	identity	in	surplus.	“Horseshit.	Nobody’s	authentic,”	Jacob	Horner
proclaimed.	Christmas,	however—not	that	it	does	him	any	good—is	authentic.	Mangled	and
mangling,	abused	and	abusive,	wounding	others	and	finally	crucified	himself,	Christmas’s
viciously	acquired	racial,	gendered,	and	religious	identity	reveals	the	contradictory	insistences
of	an	entire	culture:	this	is	exactly	why	he	matters.	The	mounting	tension	between	the	peace	he
inchoately	seeks,	inside,	and	the	violence	he	suffers	and	is	doomed	in	turn	to	inflict,	outside,
fuels	the	entire	novel—giving	us	not	the	weightlessness	of	postmodern	absurdity	but	the	gravity
of	modernist	tragedy.
A	glimpse	at	the	protagonists’	names	may	help	to	make	the	same	point.	Raskolnikov’s	name
carries	the	word	“transgression”	within	it,	but	no	one	in	the	text	finds	him	therefore	fated.	(He
has	a	mother	and	a	sister	whose	lives	move	along	different	emotional	and	ideological	axes.
There	are	several	ways	of	being	Raskolnikov;	it	is	almost	a	normal	name,	lightly	predictive	for
the	reader	but	not	compelling	for	the	character.)	At	the	other	extreme	is	Jacob	Horner.	His
name	means	nothing	to	him—there	is	and	can	be	no	family	of	Horners—it	merely	exists	as	the
arbitrary	word	that	others	(including	the	reader)	use	to	label	him;	it	in	no	way	serves	to	anchor
his	being	or	communalize	his	options.	So	far,	Dostoevsky’s	realism	and	Barth’s
postmodernism;	in	between	we	have	Faulkner’s	modernism.	Joe	Christmas’s	misnomer	is	no
less	absurd	than	“in	a	sense”	Jacob	Horner:	but	Faulkner’s	narrative	loads	this	absurd	name
with	increasing	significance.	Joe’s	name	carries	his	entire	past—not	the	family	of	Christmases
who	might	(like	Raskolnikovs)	have	bestowed	it	but	the	drunken	workers	at	the	Memphis
orphanage	who	inflict	the	name	as	a	bad	joke	on	Christmas	Eve,	the	scar	of	a	name	that
McEachern	dislikes	and	will	seek	to	alter	but	which	Joe	secretly	maintains,	the	sign	of	a	set	of
inerasable	memories	and	the	portent	of	a	doomed	future.	It	is	as	unprivate,	unserviceable,
unsustaining,	as	a	name	can	be,	one	that	can	neither	be	lived	into	normatively	(like
Raskolnikov)	nor	jettisoned	like	a	no	longer	useful	mask	in	a	game	one	is	no	longer	playing
(like	Horner).	The	symbolic	order	in	Light	in	August	thus	all	but	screams	its	dysfunction	at	us
in	its	way	of	allocating	identity-narratives	to	its	subjects.	Yet	Joe’s	painful,	touching	way	of
making	that	name	his	own	ends	by	indissolubly	fusing	the	polarity	of	“must	matter”	and	“cant
matter”	that	energizes	Faulknerian	narrative—a	time-soaked	polarity	that,	separated	out,	would
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give	us	the	simpler	coherences	of	Raskolnikov	on	the	one	hand,	and	Horner	on	the	other.	I	turn
now	to	Richard	Wright.
Native	Son	appears	eight	years	after	Light	in	August	as	a	sustained	meditation	upon	both
that	book	and	Crime	and	Punishment.	Since	I	have	made	this	sort	of	cross-cultural	literary
claim	more	than	once,	I	should	acknowledge	that,	in	a	critical	climate	suffused	with	identity
politics	and	committed	to	materialist	cultural	studies,	my	insistence	that	a	black	writer’s	text	is
deeply	affected	by	the	work	of	two	white	writers	(one	of	them	a	nineteenth-century	Russian)
may	seem	offensively	naive.	I	do	not	deny	that	it	took	a	nightmarish	childhood	in	racist
Mississippi	to	launch	Richard	Wright’s	career,	but	that	experience	alone	could	not	have
produced	his	voice.	As	Ralph	Ellison	said	in	another	context,	the	“main	source	of	any	novel	is
other	novels;	these	constitute	the	culture	of	the	form,	and	my	loyalty	to	our	group	does	nothing
to	change	that.”15	Wright,	I	want	to	argue,	is	thinking	through	Dostoevsky	and	Faulkner,	as	well
as	the	aggregate	of	his	own	cultural	experience	and	imagination,	when	he	composes	Native
Son.
The	reverse	of	Joe	Christmas,	however,	Bigger	Thomas	has	visible	racial	identity—it	is	all
people	see—but	he	himself	is	not:	his	skin	wholly	conceals	him.	Faulkner’s	text,	focused	on
his	white	culture’s	fear	of	racial	contamination,	zeroes	in	on	the	hysterical	effects	of	a	racial
code	when	the	visual	cues	it	draws	on	to	sustain	its	narratives	are	not	forthcoming.	Wright’s
text,	however,	focused	on	the	deformity	his	culture	has	undergone	at	the	hands	of	virulent	white
racism,	zeroes	in	on	the	invisibly	deformed	subject	wearing	his	all	too	visible	black	mask.	As
in	Light	in	August,	racial	identity	in	Native	Son	may	ultimately	reduce	to	a	set	of	convictions
that	constrain	behavior,	but	Bigger	eventually	learns—more	interestingly	than	Joe—how	to	do
things	with	these	convictions.16	Until	then,	though,	the	convictions	and	practices	that	constitute
the	reality	of	race	do	things	to	him,	things	that	seem	to	well	up	from	his	solar	plexus	through	his
arms	and	mind:	“Mixed	images	of	violence	ran	like	sand	through	his	mind,	dry	and	fast,
vanishing.	He	could	stab	Gus	with	his	knife….	He	could	do	a	lot	of	things	to	Gus	for	making
him	feel	this	way.”17	Like	Faulkner,	Wright	positions	the	reader	immovably	inside	his
protagonist’s	sensorium—virtually	in	Bigger’s	gut—and	we	as	readers	remain	privy	to	his
knotted	contortions.	The	cultural	codes	that	sustain	racism	have	trained	Bigger’s	mind	by
tyrannically	controlling	the	feel	and	deployment	of	his	body.	At	Dalton’s	house	“He	stood	with
his	knees	slightly	bent,	his	lips	partly	open,	his	shoulders	stooped;	and	his	eyes	held	a	look	that
went	only	to	the	surface	of	things.	There	was	an	organic	conviction	in	him	that	this	was	the	way
white	folks	wanted	him	to	be	when	in	their	presence”	(54).	Organic:	Joe	Christmas,	the
creation	of	a	white	author,	is	allowed	to	escape	the	race	dimension	of	this	awful	organtraining
—in	more	senses	than	one	Faulkner	gives	him	a	“white”	body—but	Bigger’s	body	is	physical
inheritor	of	hundreds	of	years	of	fearful	servitude.	It	is	an	unconsciously	trained	body,	the
training	begun	long	before	Bigger’s	birth.	Thus	when	Jan	and	Mary	seek	to	change	his	bodily
norms	overnight	(a	naively	arrogant	move	that	precisely	reveals	their	privilege),	Wright
conveys	Bigger’s	bodily	distress	as	these	two	white	people	cozy	up	next	to	him:	“they	made
him	feel	his	black	skin	by	just	standing	here	looking	at	him,	one	holding	his	hand	and	the	other
smiling.	He	felt	he	had	no	physical	existence	at	all	right	then;	he	was	something	he	hated,	the
badge	of	shame	which	he	knew	was	attached	to	a	black	skin”	(76).	“Organically,”	like	Joe
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Christmas,	Bigger	feels	his	culturally	imposed	body-borders	being	transgressed—“the	man”	is
suffocating	him—and	he	realizes,	like	Joe,	that	“something	is	going	to	happen	to	me.”	His	race-
engineered	body	is	going	to	explode.
Once	it	does	explode,	something	unexpected	happens,	and	here	is	where	Native	Son	departs
from	its	parameters	of	Faulknerian	doom.	This	apparently	naturalist	novel—the	story	of	a	man
destroyed	by	social	forces	he	can	neither	understand	nor	resist—suddenly	becomes	briefly
postmodern.	That	is,	it	begins	not	only	to	foreground	the	linguistic	but	to	see	language	as	prior
to	the	scenes	language	launches.18Native	Son	starts	to	play	with	its	culture’s	differential
narratives	for	licensing	identity.	Trapped	within	the	very	citadel	of	patriarchal	space—the
smothered	girl’s	bedroom	inside	the	Dalton	mansion—Bigger	starts	(perhaps	for	the	first	time
in	his	life)	to	reflect:
And,	after	all,	was	not	Jan	a	Red?	…	Fingerprints!	He	had	read	about	them	in	magazines….	But	suppose	he	told	them	that
he	had	come	to	get	the	trunk?	That	was	it!	The	trunk!	His	fingerprints	had	a	right	to	be	here….	But	there	was	still	a	better
way!	Make	them	think	that	Jan	did	it.	Reds’d	do	anything.	Didn’t	the	papers	say	so?	…	If	Mary	were	missing	when	they
got	up,	would	they	not	think	that	she	had	already	gone	to	Detroit?	He….	Yes!	He	could,	he	could	put	her	in	the	trunk!	She
was	small.	Yes;	put	her	in	the	trunk….	He	stooped	to	put	her	in	the	trunk.	Could	he	get	her	in?	…	He	pushed	her	head	into
a	corner,	but	her	legs	were	too	long	and	would	not	go	in….	[then	after	carrying	her	in	the	trunk	down	to	the	basement]	He
stared	at	the	furnace.	He	trembled	with	another	idea.	He—he	could,	he—he	could	put	her,	he	could	put	her	in	the	furnace.
He	would	burn	her!	That	was	the	safest	thing	to	do….	He	had	all	but	her	shoulders	in	…	her	clothes	were	ablaze	and
smoke	was	filling	the	interior….	He	gripped	her	shoulders	and	pushed	hard,	but	the	body	would	not	go	any	farther.	He	tried
again,	but	her	head	still	remained	out….	He	got	his	knife	from	his	pocket	and	opened	it	and	stood	by	the	furnace,	looking	at
Mary’s	white	throat.	Could	he	do	it?	…	Gently,	he	sawed	the	blade	into	the	flesh	and	struck	a	bone.	He	gritted	his	teeth	and
cut	harder….	But	the	bone	made	it	difficult….	He	whacked	harder,	but	the	head	would	not	come	off….	He	had	to	burn	this
girl.	With	eyes	glazed,	with	nerves	tingling	with	excitement,	he	looked	about	the	basement.	He	saw	a	hatchet.	Yes!	…	He
…	sent	the	blade	of	the	hatchet	into	the	bone	of	the	throat	with	all	the	strength	of	his	body.	The	head	rolled	off.	(100–6,
emphases	in	original)
Bigger	pulls	off	precisely	the	murder	that	Crime	and	Punishment	is	committed	to	make	fail.
Seeking	a	stance	beyond	his	culture’s	imprisoning	norms	of	good	and	evil,	Raskolnikov
committed	murder—only	to	find	himself	sinking	into	the	torments	of	traditional	guilt.	His	body
could	not	bear	the	consequences	of	what	his	rebellious	mind	had	irresponsibly	proposed.	The
cautionary	core	of	Dostoevsky’s	novel	centers	on	just	this	lawfulness	lodged	within	the	subject
at	a	level	beneath	thought.	Bigger,	however,	rises	into	the	freedom	of	amoral	crime—a	freedom
profoundly	troubling	in	its	gender	configuration	yet	intoxicating	in	its	liberation	from	a	white
scenario	of	values.19	Dismembering	Mary,	once	clear	of	biblical	codes	of	judgment	(codes
produced	by	and	for	“the	man”),	reduces	to	a	hatchet	job,	an	engineering	problem.	In	a	setting
suddenly	departing	from	humanism	and	reduced	to	pure	pragmatics,	Mary	is	so	much	matter	to
be	disposed	of.	From	this	guiltless	height	Bigger	assumes	his	own	invisibility,	resurveys	the
entire	scene	(its	race-saturated	biases	startlingly	visible	to	him,	as	though	highlighted	by
ultraviolet),	and	he	recognizes	others’	systemic	blindness:	“The	very	manner	in	which	[his
sister	Vera]	sat	showed	a	fear	so	deep	as	to	be	an	organic	part	of	her”	(122).	“Organic”:	the
word	now	characterizes	behavior	others	take	as	nature	but	which	Bigger	decodes	as	training.
This	newfound	grasp	of	the	racial	narrative	being	performed	serves	as	a	skeleton	key	that
momentarily	opens	all	doors.
He	begins	to	manipulate,	undetected,	the	part	he	earlier	merely	enacted.	His	“yessuh”
sounds	no	different	but	it	has	become	artful;	his	culture’s	repertory	of	scripts	now	cues—rather
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than	suffocates—his	“dumb	nigger”	agency.	Communism,	racism,	the	Leopold-Loeb	case:	these
once	opaque	phenomena	now	become	so	many	miniature	narratives	he	is	able	to	deploy,
providing	grist	for	his	mill,	motives	for	his	gestures.	He	mixes	and	matches,	making	it	up	as	he
goes—a	Lévi-Straussian	bricoleur	before	Derrida	ever	glossed	the	term.	Wright	shows	all	the
plays	and	players	in	this	unfolding	scenario	to	be	scripted,	but	Bigger’s	invisibility	consists	in
alone	recognizing—and	exploiting—the	script	he	speaks.	Not	for	a	moment	does	he	believe	a
word	of	it;	he	has	become	“in	a	sense	Bigger	Thomas.”	We	are	in	the	world	of	arbitrary
language	games,	and	in	the	presence	of	a	sort	of	negotiated	freedom	that	Michel	de	Certeau
calls	“tactics”:	“The	space	of	a	tactic,”	de	Certeau	writes,	“is	the	space	of	the	other.	Thus	it
must	play	on	and	with	a	terrain	imposed	on	it	and	organized	by	the	law	of	a	foreign	power.	It
does	not	have	the	means	to	keep	to	itself,	at	a	distance,	in	a	position	of	withdrawal,	foresight,
and	self-collection:	it	is	a	maneuver	…	within	enemy	territory.”20	Bigger	needed	a	hatchet	to
take	care	of	Mary,	but	all	he	needs	is	linguistic	self-consciousness	to	handle	Dalton	and	his
minions.	Like	Hawthorne’s	Wakefield,	Bigger	thus	becomes	sublimely	present	at	his	own
absence,	watching	others	not	see	him.	Wright	fiendishly	stations	him	in	the	very	guts	of	the
white	master’s	home—tender	of	its	flame	and	visible	keeper	of	its	domestic	viability,	secret
murderer	of	its	precious	offspring.	A	successful	Raskolnikov,	a	focused	Joe	Christmas,	the
invisible	Bigger	exults	in	the	drama	of	Mary’s	corpse	being	only	a	few	feet	away	from	some	of
the	most	powerful	men	in	Chicago	speculating	on	its	whereabouts.
I’ve	called	these	scenes	postmodern,	by	which	I	mean	that	they	enact	an	almost	manic
release	in	Bigger’s	performance	of	roles	others	take	to	be	natural.	All	is	script	and	pastiche
here;	we	are	beyond	the	modernist	longing	for	some	authentic	discourse	uninflected	by
ideology.	And	Bigger	is	beyond	ideology.21	If	for	Dostoevsky	the	religious	law	has	ceased	to
compel	intellectual	assent,	it	remains	precious	and—stubbornly	encoded	in	Raskolnikov’s
body	regardless	of	his	mind’s	presumption—it	ensures	the	transgressor’s	defeat.	If	for
Faulkner	the	law	has	become	racedeformed,	a	license	for	torture	and	murder	when	in	the	hands
of	Hines	or	McEachern	or	Grimm,	we	yet	continue	to	register	(from	an	implicitly	white
perspective)	the	gravity	of	social	training,	the	tragic	consequences	of	social	training	gone
wrong.	Like	Light	in	August,	Native	Son	knows	that	the	law	is	the	law,	and	it	will	make	its
protagonist	die	the	death	for	his	transgression,	but	it	lets	him	briefly	exercise	his	powers
(enjoy	a	tactical	success)	before	doing	so.
More,	Wright	reveals,	as	perhaps	only	a	black	writer	could	reveal—in	the	dark	comedy	of
Bigger’s	violent	release—a	racial	world	suddenly	emptied	of	justification	and	tonically
clarified.	(Joe	Christmas’s	crime	is	never	revelatory	in	this	way,	never	anything	but	an
unavoidable	mistake;	Bigger’s	crime	is	no	mistake	at	all,	but	terrifyingly	pedagogic.)	As
linguistically	limited	as	Joe,	Bigger	has	yet	learned	to	manipulate	others’	speech,	to	maneuver
on	their	space,	and	to	behave—nihilistically—as	if	there	were	no	deeper	purposes	legitimizing
this	drama,	ordering	its	unfolding.	Indeed,	Bigger	reads	this	Foucauldian	power	scene	so
effectively	that	Wright	is	unable	to	provide	any	later	justificatory	narrative	(including	Max’s)
that	Bigger	will	accept	as	a	mirror	for	his	own	motives	and	behavior.	Bigger	cannot	be
mirrored;	the	text	can	provide	no	ideological	frame	that	might	hold	him	within	its	focus.	In	this
protopostmodern	novel	everyone	suddenly	speaks	only	language.	Awaiting	his	execution,
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Bigger	remains	not	only	invisible	to	others	(his	executioners	think	him	a	black	beast	while
even	Max	sees	him	as	just	a	black	victim),	but	opaque	to	himself	as	well,	lacking	any
conceptual	schema	that	might	turn	his	exalted	moments	of	release	into	a	new	self-narrative.
“Only	through	the	intersubjectivity	of	community	can	consciousness	become	self-
consciousness,”	Houston	Baker	says	of	the	absence	of	epiphany	here.22	There	are	no	others	on
this	stage	whom	Bigger	might	recognize	as	potential	extensions	of	himself,	in	whose	company
he	might	verbally	reaccess	himself.	Instead,	“he	smiled	a	faint,	wry,	bitter	smile.	He	heard	the
ring	of	steel	against	steel	as	a	far	door	clanged	shut”	(502).	On	this	implacable	note	Native
Son	ends.
Wright’s	“The	Man	Who	Lived	Underground”	serves	as	the	obvious	segue	between	Native
Son	and	Invisible	Man.	The	postmodern	elements	glimpsed	in	Native	Son	are	here	more	fully
displayed;	once	again	Dostoevsky	gives	Wright	his	cue.	On	the	run	from	the	cops	for	a	murder
he	didn’t	commit,	Fred	Daniels	goes	literally	underground,	diving	into	a	sewer.	Become
invisible	himself,	Daniels	is	now	permitted	to	see	everything.	His	sewer	(no	longer
malodorous,	transformed	into	a	place	of	promise	rather	than	of	excretion)	becomes	a	sort	of
Deleuzian	rhizome,	a	line	of	escape	underlying	(and	opening	into)	all	the	institutions	of	the	city
above	ground	(church,	movie	house,	morgue,	typing	office,	butcher	shop,	etc.).	It	is	as	though
Wright	had	taken	Bigger’s	furnace	scenario	of	Native	Son	and	made	it	movable.	The	earlier
text’s	concealment	transforms	into	the	later	text’s	mobility.	To	use	de	Certeau’s	terms,	a
tactical	invisibility	(confined	to	the	enemy’s	territory)	opens	into	a	strategic	invisibility
(command	of	a	new	space	liberated	from	the	enemy’s	control).
A	limitlessly	networked	Daniels	outdoes	not	only	Bigger	Thomas	but	Robinson	Crusoe	in
his	capacity	to	gather	up	a	culture’s	entire	arsenal	of	goods.	But	Wright	has	Daniels	do	with
those	purloined	goods	what	no	realist	novelist	like	Defoe	could	imagine:	Daniels	undoes	their
symbolic	exchange	value	and	recodes	them	as	material	objects	of	play.	Light	bulbs,	paper
money,	guns	with	cartridges,	diamonds:	all	of	these	are	spread	out	and	rearranged	in	Daniels’s
underground	lair,	regaining	their	original	innocence,	cleansed	of	their	capitalist	function	as
items	men	once	competed	for.	This	Utopian	fantasy	of	a	play-space—this	deliberate
infantilizing	of	capitalism’s	motives	and	objects	that	hold	adults	in	thrall	above—cannot	elude
the	consequences	of	past	time	forever,	and	Daniels	eventually	chooses	to	exit	from	his
underground	kingdom	of	invisibility,	suicidally	confessing	to	the	same	cops	who	originally
chased	him.	In	an	uncanny	echo	of	both	Raskolnikov	and	Christmas,	Daniels	thinks:	“Why	was
this	sense	of	guilt	so	seemingly	innate,	so	easy	to	come	by,	to	think,	to	feel,	so	verily	physical?
It	seemed	that	when	one	felt	this	guilt	one	was	retracing	in	one’s	feelings	a	faint	pattern
designed	long	before	…	but	which	had	been	forgotten	by	the	conscious	mind,	creating	in	one’s
life	a	state	of	eternal	anxiety.”23	Ultimately,	the	white	man’s	guilt-centered	law	recaptures	him,
instilling	its	anxieties,	and	the	black	man	relinquishes	his	interlude	of	invisibility,	moves	to
accept	his	doom.	In	both	these	texts,	then,	the	inevitable	execution	of	a	black	man	(recalling	the
race	logic	of	Light	in	August)	is	only	interrupted,	played	with,	briefly	reconceived	outside	the
law-supported	necessity	of	racist	annihilation.	These	are	the	hints	that	Ellison	drew	on	to
compose	the	jewel	in	this	crown	of	invisibility	I	have	been	analyzing.
Rewriting	Fred	Daniels’s	underground	sewer,	Ellison’s	Invisible	Man	opens	in	a
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Certeauvian	play-space,	replete	with	1369	lights	tactically	“borrowed”	from	and	operated	by
Monopolated	Light	and	Power.	The	fact	that	“the	man”	monopolizes	all	the	space	above
launches	Ellison’s	postmodern	revision	of	Dostoevskian	and	Faulknerian	invisibility.	Just	as
invisibility	is	mainly	a	defect	in	Notes	from	Underground	and	Light	in	August	(it	launches	no
new	models	of	selfhood,	provides	no	landscape	beyond	the	reach	of	hegemonic	norms),	it
remains	here—at	the	level	of	plot	and	theme—pure	liability,	the	motif	of	victimization.	But
Ellison	turns	invisibility,	at	the	same	time,	into	an	extraordinary	formal	resource.	Invisible
Man	is	not	only	unseen	by	others,	his	body	is	unseen	by	the	text,	and	therefore	unseen	by	the
reader.	Such	furnishing	of	invisibility	subtly	turns	the	abuse	that	lodges	in	this	novel’s	plot	into
the	privilege	that	nourishes	its	narrative	procedure,	its	way	of	producing	its	elusive,
anonymous	protagonist.	Freed	(so	to	speak)	of	a	finite	and	penetrable	body,	immune	to	lasting
bodily	pain,	he	is	allowed	to	become	for	the	reader	a	mobile	and	inexhaustible	repository	of
“soul.”24	As	Ellison	wrote	in	“What	America	Would	Be	Like	Without	Blacks”:
Without	the	presence	of	Negro	American	style,	our	jokes,	our	tall	tales,	even	our	sports	would	be	lacking	in	the	sudden
turns,	the	shocks,	the	swift	changes	of	pace	(all	jazz-shaped)	that	serve	to	remind	us	that	the	world	is	ever	unexplored,	and
that	while	a	complete	mastery	of	life	is	mere	illusion,	the	real	secret	of	the	game	is	to	make	life	swing.	It	is	the	ability	to
articulate	this	tragiccomic	attitude	toward	life	that	explains	much	of	the	mysterious	power	and	attractiveness	of	that	quality
of	Negro	American	style	known	as	“soul.”25
Invisible	Man	pulses	with	the	insouciance	of	such	articulated	“soul.”	The	memorable
scenes	in	the	novel	are	hallucinatorily	written,	with	the	narrator	somehow	adroitly	detached
even	while	technically	present—immured	yet	uncaught.	Beginning	with	the	Battle	Royal,	then
going	on	to	the	hypnotic	Trueblood	monologue	and	the	manic	scene	at	the	Golden	Day,
followed	by	the	extraordinary	explosions	at	the	Liberty	Paints	factory	and	the	subsequent
hospital	scene,	this	book	stages	a	set	of	carnivalistic	tours	de	force—birthings	and	testings—
that	exceed	anyone’s	sense	of	statistical	reality,	of	what	can	happen	to	any	single,	embodied
player.	Few	of	these	scandalous	encounters	would	have	their	tonic	effect,	though,	without	a
sort	of	comic-book	bodily	immunity	on	the	part	of	the	narrator.	Even	the	Battle	Royal	and	the
hospital	scenes	(the	ones	where	the	most	physical	violence	comes	his	way)	are	bathed	in	an
unbruised	narrational	poise	that	allows	supreme	lucidity.	He	is	never	tired	for	long;	he	can’t	be
kept	down;	his	experience	never	damagingly	entangles	him.	But	we	don’t	watch	him	anyway
(we	can’t	see	him):	we	watch	instead	what	he	hallucinatorily	narrates	for	us	to	see.	That	is,	he
performs	at	all	times	(and	not	only	during	the	set	speeches)	as	an	orator,	seducing	most
tellingly	not	his	plotted	audience	but	his	myriad	reader.	This	is	seduction	shorn	of	mastery,
lucidity	without	omniscience—mastery	and	omniscience	are	“illusions”—but	the	secret	is	“to
make	life	swing,”	and	Ellison’s	narrator	swings.	All	eyes	and	thought	and	forward-moving
ambition	(kept	clear	by	Ellison	of	love	or	hate	relations	that	might	articulate	his	bodiness,	halt
his	trajectory,	and	reveal	his	personal	dimensionality),	Invisible	Man	enacts	a	journey	that
stages	instead	the	absurdity	of	institutional	America.
“Play	the	game	but	don’t	believe	in	it,”26	the	Golden	Day	vet	advises	him,	and	though	he
may	not	catch	up	to	this	advice	until	many	disillusionments	later,	its	mix	of	naive	investment
and	ironic	detachment	continuously	enriches	the	texture	of	Ellison’s	narrative	voice.	Like
Bigger	momentarily,	like	Fred	Daniels	when	underground,	Invisible	Man	learns	to	play	the
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prejudicial	language	games	that	play	him.	“I	rapes	real	good	when	I’m	drunk”	(521),	he
assures	Sybil,	and	this	tactical	exploitation	of	the	stereotype	he	knows	he	embodies	for	others
—this	use	of	his	invisibility—is	almost	wholly	outside	Joe	Christmas’s	range.	(Christmas,
lacking	any	sense	for	how	to	manage	racial	prejudice	except	through	violence,	does	rape,	and
not	just	when	drunk.)	Invisible	Man	adroitly	talks	his	way	out	of	almost	every	dilemma	that
entraps	him.	His	wit	and	detachment—subtly	abetted	by	bodily	invisibility—grant	him	a
sidestepping	resourcefulness	outside	the	range	of	Faulkner’s	and	Wright’s	less	vocal	and	more
exposed,	more	finite	protagonists.	More	than	just	a	capacity	to	manage	“the	sudden	turns,	the
shocks,	the	swift	changes	of	pace,”	such	adaptability	on	the	part	of	his	protagonist	allows
Ellison	to	reprise	earlier	fictional	dilemmas	and	make	them	speak	their	larger-than-life
potential:	Bigger’s	crowded	family	scene	blossoms	into	Trueblood’s	domestic	scandal,	Bigger
and	Gus’s	J.	P.	Morgan	riff	manically	escalates	into	the	Golden	Day’s	General	Pershing
extravaganza.	At	its	extreme	such	metamorphic	flexibility	in	this	novel	takes	on	the	name	of
Rinehart.	An	almost	mythic	figure,	Rinehard	supremely	embodies	(but	that’s	not	the	right	verb)
the	elasticity	I’ve	been	describing	in	Invisible	Man.	You	cannot	see	Rinehart;	you	only	see	his
racial	insignia—his	dark	glasses,	his	white	hat—and	these	allow	him	to	function	in	all	the
games	he	undertakes:	runner,	preacher,	gambler,	lover.	He	is	the	ultimate	in	unsanctioned
performativity,	in	depthless	simulacra:	“And	sitting	there	trembling	I	caught	a	brief	glimpse	of
the	possibilities	posed	by	Rinehart’s	multiple	personalities	and	turned	away”	(499).
“Turned	away”:	I	want	to	start	to	close	this	talk	by	suggesting	why	Ellison’s	novel	turns
away	from	its	own	postmodern	investment	in	identity	as	simulacra,	feigned	and
useful/discardable	entities.	The	main	reason	lodges	deep	in	the	novel’s	political	imagination.
The	ever-mobile	Rinehart—lacking	any	core—carries	no	political	promise,	the	static	Ras	the
Destroyer—arrested	on	his	single	core-idea—promises	only	violence.	In	between,	however,	is
the	politics	of	race	hauntingly	voiced	by	Invisible	Man	himself.	The	Saul-become-Paul	moment
occurs	when	he	wanders	into	the	Harlem	scene	of	eviction.	Contingent	wandering	here
catalyzes	essential	vocation,	as	he	watches	an	old	black	couple	being	turned	out,	their	lifetime
possessions	cast	into	the	street:	a	portrait	of	them	when	young,	a	pair	of	“knocking	bones,”	pots
of	plants,	a	straightening	comb,	a	faded	tintype	of	Abraham	Lincoln,	some	cracked	pieces	of
china,	a	folded	lace	fan,	an	old	breast	pump….	Hearing	the	old	woman	sob,	registering	it	like
the	child	who	sees	“the	tears	of	its	parents….	I	turned	away,	feeling	myself	being	drawn	to	the
old	couple	by	a	warm,	dark,	rising	whirlpool	of	emotion	which	I	feared”	(270).	At	this	point
he	launches	into	his	song/sermon	of	dispossession,	a	self-authenticating	speech	that	takes	these
“evicted”	items	and	reattaches	them	to	the	historical	narrative	that	supplies	their	human
meaning.	The	political	resonance	of	that	time-soaked	narrative—its	locating	of	objects	within
an	overwhelmingly	coherent	racial	history—is	exactly	the	reverse	of	postmodern	amnesia	and
its	array	of	verbal	signs	emptied	of	reference,	carrying	only	exchange	value.	Here	is
Baudrillard	on	the	postmodern	semiotic	event:	“At	the	limit	of	an	always	increasing
elimination	of	references	and	finalities,	an	ever	increasing	loss	of	resemblances	and
designations,	we	find	the	digital	and	programmatic	sign,	whose	‘value’	is	purely	tactical”—a
far	cry	from	the	sign	as	“bound,	impregnated,	and	heavy	with	connotation”	(22),	the	sign	as
metonymic	reminder	of	a	shared	racial	past.27
Ellison’s	novel	achieves	its	surreal	elasticity	precisely	by	bypassing	its	protagonist’s	finite
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and	embodied	racial	past.	Apart	from	his	grandfather	he	is	without	family	connections;	almost
no	experience	seems	to	come	earlier	(or	lodge	deeper)	than	his	college	years.	He	has	little
unconscious	life,	few	memories	that	believe	before	knowing	remembers.	Yet	this	novel	draws
decisively	on	the	larger	race	history	in	which,	all	along,	he	involuntarily	participates.	(Here	is
his	deepest	difference	from	both	Joe	Christmas	and	Bigger	Thomas,	the	one	simply	lacking	in	a
race	history—Faulkner	could	not	supply	it—the	other	seeking	to	escape	a	race	history	he
registers	as	pure	deformation.)	However	Invisible	Man	may	try	to	soar	beyond	himself,	body
and	past	magically	transcended,	he	remains	inextricably	race-oriented.	His	brotherhood
speeches	succeed	only	insofar	as	they	sound	this	bass	note	of	racial	inheritance	and
dispossession.28	Like	a	rhythmic	undercurrent,	this	novel	intimates	the	larger	history	of	black
bondage	and	freedom	through	its	deployment	of	vivid,	time-saturated,	race-imbued	items:	Tod
Clifton’s	Sambo	doll,	Tarp’s	leg	shackle,	the	resonance	of	yams	and	chittelings,	the	snatches
and	“echoes	of	blues-toned	laughter”	(xvi).	The	narrator	may	seem	deathless	(bodiless,
invisible),	but	his	alter-ego,	Tod	Clifton,	is	not.	Ellison	reminds	us	that	Tod’s	name	signals
death	(in	German),	and	Tod’s	massive	funeral	ceremony	releases	into	articulation	the	long
history	of	blacks	cut	down	in	their	promise.	Here,	in	in	the	rise	and	fall	of	this	intensely
described,	poignantly	finite,	black	body,	Ellison	returns	to	the	pain	of	racial	visibility	that
attaches	American	blacks	to	their	ongoing	history	on	these	shores.	In	thus	joining	Faulkner	and
Wright	in	acknowledging	a	racial	injustice	that	concludes	in	murder	rather	than	hibernation,
Ellison	concedes	the	disfiguring	power	of	the	gaze,	the	injustice	it	has	long	caused	and	still
causes—all	this	as	necessarily	prelude	to	the	liberating	politics	such	shared	and	testimonial
suffering	may	yet	launch.
Jacob	Horner	may	be	himself	only	“in	a	sense,”	but	that	novel	too	closes	on	the	death	of
Rennie	Morgan.	We	may	not	be	ourselves	for	sure,	but	our	bodies	do	surely	become
extinguished	in	time.	My	first-person	plural	pronoun	is	appropriately	all-inclusive,	yet	can	it
be	an	accident	that	the	desire	to	escape	such	extinction—a	desire	that	underwrites	the	very
trope	of	invisibility—attaches	so	readily	to	male	protagonists?	That	it	is	especially	males	who
seek	to	run,	fly,	and	flee	the	fixing,	finite-making,	yet	also	communal	gaze	of	the	other:	the	gaze
that	makes	you	seen?	Rennie	Morgan	is	visible	to	a	fault,	so	are	Joanna	Burden	in	Light	in
August	and	Bessie	Mears	in	Native	Son.	Not	only	are	all	three	of	these	women	condemned	by
their	texts	to	death,	two	of	their	deaths	suggestively	revolve	about	the	phenomenon	of
pregnancy.	Is	the	fact	that	each	of	us	traces	in	our	altering	body	a	single,	unrepeatable	existence
on	earth	a	condition	males	never	tire	of	imaginatively	transcending,	even	as	this	condition
registers	so	differently	in	the	pregnant	woman’s	body,	a	site	that	conjoins—simultaneously	and
unbearably—the	realities	of	generativity,	penetrability,	and	extinction?	Is	the	fact,	likewise,
that	these	are	among	the	loneliest	narratives	in	American	literature—hypnotic	stories	of
invisible	men	who	register	the	otherness	of	the	social	as	shock	and	wound	rather	than
awakening	and	possibility—is	this	cherishing	of	privacy	better	seen	as	a	resource	to	be	tapped
or	a	neurosis	to	be	analyzed?
Indeed,	the	functioning	of	social	reality	itself	is	premised	upon	visibility—to	others	and,
reciprocally,	to	oneself	as	well.	As	John	McGowan	puts	it	in	his	study	of	postmodernism,	“Just
as	the	self	is	recognized	by	the	community	as	a	member	of	that	group	who	occupies	a	certain
position	and	possesses	certain	abilities,	so	the	self	must	recognize	the	individual	recognized	by
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the	group	as	himself”	(246).	From	underground	man	to	invisible	man:	here	precisely	is	the	cost
of	invisibility,	the	cultural	price	that	nonrecognition	imposes,	the	isolation	it	both	suffers	from
and	seeks	out.	Richard	Rorty	tends	to	find	such	nonreciprocity	productively	liberating:	the
postmodern	ironist,	he	writes,	“is	not	in	the	business	of	supplying	himself	and	his	fellow
ironists	with	a	method,	a	platform,	or	a	rationale.	He	is	just	doing	the	same	thing	all	ironists	do
—attempting	autonomy”	(97).	Autonomy,	yes,	but	didn’t	Faulkner’s	ironical	Mr.	Compson	seek
out	the	same	value,	imagining	himself	as	socially	invisible	and	betraying	the	responsibilities	of
community	in	the	same	way?	It	may	be	Levinas	rather	than	Barthes	who	best	points	us	to	the
requirement	that	we	be	visible—recognizable	to,	answerable	for,	the	array	of	others	who
necessarily	constitute	our	scene.	As	Edith	Wyschogrod	(a	writer	deeply	influenced	by	Levinas)
claims,	“It	is	the	vulnerability	of	the	other	that	challenges	the	structure	of	the	self	as	an	egology.
When	the	other	appears	she	does	not	emerge	as	an	object	in	the	world	or	even	a	person	…	but
as	a	proscriptive	moral	datum.	Coordinate	with	her	sheer	existence,	built	into	it	as	it	were,	is
her	vulnerability	which	acts	as	a	solicitation	and	a	proscription:	‘Do	not	injure	me.’”29
“Do	not	injure	me”:	to	what	extent	do	the	invisible	men	in	the	texts	I’ve	examined	exercise
an	“egology”	perilously	restricted	to	the	first-personal	singular	pronoun,	and	disturbingly
liable	to	the	injuring	of	others—especially	women—in	their	pursuit	of	autonomy?	Such
questions	go	further	than	I	can	take	them,	but	I	could	not	relinquish	this	musing	on	invisibility
without	at	least	suggesting	the	profound	uninnocence	of	the	trope.	Be	that	as	it	may,	I	began
with	one	postmodernist,	Barth,	on	the	ruse	of	“not	being	there,”	and	I	conclude	with	another
postmodernist,	Rushdie,	on	the	stakes	of	“being	there.”	As	Rushdie	beautifully	puts	it	in	The
Satanic	Verses,	“The	world	is	the	place	we	prove	real	by	dying	in	it.”30	Faulkner,	Wright,	and
Ellison	(good	modernists	all)	would	not	have	worded	it	that	way,	but	their	imagination	of	race
finds	the	world	proved	real	for	kindred	reasons.	Without	the	concomitant	reality	of	others
irrevocably	related	to	us,	vulnerable	to	pain	and	ultimately	to	death—as	we	are—the
individual	trajectory	would	have	little	resonance,	its	autonomy	be	of	little	value.	All	three
writers	compel	our	attention	insofar	as	they	honor	the	gravity	of	our	group-shared	yet
unrepeatable	passage,	the	ultimate	cost	and	value	of	our	inhabiting	bodies	that	remain—
however	misrecognized—visible	in	space	and	extensive	in	time.
NOTES
1. Apart	from	numerous	brilliant	articles,	the	booklength	studies	of	postmodernism	from	which	I	have	most	benefited	are
those	of	Andreas	Huyssen	(After	the	Great	Divide:	Modernism,	Mass	Culture,	Postmodernism	[Bloomington:	Indiana
University	Press,	1986]),	John	McGowan	(Postmodernism	and	Its	Critics	[Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	1991]),	and	David
Harvey	(The	Condition	of	Postmodernity	[Oxford:	Blackwell’s,	1989]).	Each	of	these	writers	refuses	to	romanticize
postmodernism	as	a	heroic	repudiation	of	all	that	has	gone	before.	Instead,	they	explore	the	intricate	ways	in	which	postmodern
developments	both	proceed	from	and	call	into	question	a	range	of	modernist	assumptions	(beginning	with	the	Enlightenment),
within	a	broad	spectrum	of	human	endeavors	(arts,	sciences,	philosophy,	and	architecture,	most	prominently).	They	all	refuse,
that	is,	the	shrill	rhetorical	amazement	that,	in	Robert	Siegel’s	words,	we	could	“ever	have	supposed	that	representations	were
anything	but	words,	that	consciousness	was	anything	but	words,	that	‘Man’	was	more	than	a	representation,	a	life	in	words
punctuated	by	bursts	of	the	inhuman”	(“Postmodernism	TM”,	in	Modern	Fiction	Studies	41:1	[Spring	1995]:	178).	More
persuasive,	in	my	view,	is	Linda	Hutcheon’s	qualified	claim	that	“It	is	not	that	representation	now	dominates	or	effaces	the
referent,	but	that	it	now	self-consciously	acknowledges	its	existence	as	representation”	(The	Politics	of	Postmodernism
[London:	Routledge,	1989],	34).
2. For	the	purposes	of	this	argument,	Morrison	and	Calvino	are	both	considered	postmodernists.	It	might	be	more	fruitful,
however,	to	analyze	Morrison’s	work	within	a	postcolonial	frame	of	assumptions,	for	the	reconception	of	a	stable	(but	not
bourgeois-appropriative)	subject	is	as	important	a	task	of	postcolonial	literature	as	the	dismantling	of	the	bourgeois-appropriative
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subject	is	critical	to	much	postmodern	literature.
3. Donald	Barthelme,	“Sentence,”	in	Gerhard	Hoffmann	and	Alfred	Hornung,	ed.,	Ethics	and	Aesthetics:	The	Moral	Turn
of	Postmodernism	(Heidelberg,	1996),	118.
4. John	Barth,	The	End	of	the	Road	(1958;	New	York:	Bantam,	1967),	1.	Subsequent	citation	refers	to	this	edition.
5. Jean	Baudrillard,	“Simulacra	and	Simulations,”	in	The	Baudrillard	Reader,	trans.	Mark	Poster	(Stanford:	Stanford
University	Press,	1988),	167.
6. William	Faulkner,	Light	in	August:	The	Corrected	Text,	ed.	Noel	Polk	(New	York:	Vintage	International,	1990),	384.
Subsequent	citation	refers	to	this	edition.
7. Fyodor	Dostoevsky,	Notes	from	Underground,	trans.	Richard	Pevear	and	Larissa	Volokhonsky	(New	York:	Vintage,
1994),	5.
8. Dostoevskyan	commentary,	cushioned	by	existentialist	clichés,	typically	misses	this	darker,	failed	dimension	of	the
Underground	Man,	preferring	instead	to	speak	of	his	rebellion	as	an	“affirmation	of	the	supreme	worth	of	the	individual”
(Michael	Lynch,	Creative	Revolt:	A	Study	of	Wright,	Ellison,	and	Dostoevsky	[New	York:	Peter	Lang,	1990],	37).
9. Joseph	Frank,	“Ralph	Ellison	and	a	Literary	‘Ancestor’:	Dostoevsky,”	in	The	New	Criterion	2:1(1983):	12.
10. The	“underground”	is	not	only	a	capacious	and	fluid	concept	in	Dostoevsky’s	work—embracing	simultaneously
geographic,	economic,	psychological,	religious,	and	philosophic	realms—but	its	usage	also	alters	significantly	during	his	career.
The	mainly	negative	resonance	of	“underground”	in	the	1865	Notes	gives	way	to	a	range	of	creative	reverberations	in
Dostoevsky’s	last	novel,	The	Brothers	Karamazov	(1882).	See	Monroe	Beardsley’s	essay	(in	Notes	from	Underground,	trans.
Serge	Shishkoff	[New	York:	Crowell,	1969],	229–60)	for	further	commentary.
11. See	Joseph	Frank’s	five-volume	biography	of	Dostoevsky	(esp.	vols.	2	and	3)	for	a	useful	mapping	of	the	ideological
climate	operative	in	St.	Petersburg	during	the	1850s	and	1860s,	when	Dostoevsky	was	coming	into	his	powers	as	a	novelist.	For
an	extraordinary	reading	of	the	functioning	of	ideology	within	Dostoevsky’s	work,	see	Mikhail	Bakhtin’s	Problems	in
Dostoevsky’s	Poetics	(trans.	Caryl	Emerson	[Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1984]).
12. Such	rabid	insistence	on	racial	markers	may	testify	to	a	postwar	American	South	of	the	1920s	in	which	these	markers
were	becoming	suddenly	less	reliable.	Daniel	Singal	argues	that	“[t]owns	that	had	been	relatively	stable	suddenly	experienced	a
sizable	influx	of	strangers	whose	origins	were	wholly	unknown.	Where	once	it	had	been	highly	unlikely	for	a	resident	to	have
‘black	blood’	without	the	town	knowing	of	it,	the	system	of	community	genealogy	was	now	doomed”	(The	War	Within:	From
Victorian	to	Modernist	Thought	in	the	South,	1919–1945	[Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1982],	182).
13. For	further	commentary	on	the	creative	interplay	(in	Faulkner’s	great	work)	of	the	forms	of	modernist	doubt	with	the
contents	of	traditional	knowledge,	see	my	What	Else	But	Love?	The	Ordeal	of	Race	in	Faulkner	and	Morrison	(New	York:
Columbia	University	Press,	1996),	167–72,	185–9.
14. To	put	it	perhaps	more	succinctly:	if	As	I	Lay	Dying’s	“just	a	shape	to	fill	a	lack”	is	Faulkner’s	most	haunting	formulation
for	the	arbitrariness	of	words,	then	a	good	deal	of	postmodern	fiction	takes	this	arbitrariness	as	inalterable.	The	human	drama
becomes	parody	because	it	is	unavoidably	told	second-hand,	in	that	realm	of	weakness	we	call	words.	But	Faulkner	seemed	to
believe	that,	although	we	tell	our	lives	“in	the	air,”	we	live	our	lives,	unspeakably,	“on	the	ground.”	In	his	most	compelling	work
he	invents,	as	no	postmodernist	seeks	to,	an	unspeakable	ground	language.	This	local	distinction	is	also	a	larger	one	between
modernist	and	postmodernist	ambitions.	As	Gianni	Vattino	puts	it	in	The	End	of	Modernity	(1985,	trans.	Jon	R.	Snyder
[Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1988]),	“From	architecture	to	the	novel	to	poetry	to	the	figurative	arts,	the
postmodern	displays,	as	its	most	common	and	imposing	trait,	an	effort	to	free	itself	from	the	logic	of	overcoming,	development,
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